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WHAT DRIVES JAPANESE WHALING POLICY?
The debates about whaling are reported to hinge around the issues of animal welfare (Brakes
and Simmonds, 2011), science (Burnett, 2012) and clashes over diﬀering cultural perspectives
(Hirata, 2005). However, the dynamics that shape the hunting of the great whales managed through
the International Whaling Commission (IWC), are much more complex. Stakeholders act under
signiﬁcant forces not always directly relevant to the conservation or exploitation of wildlife, or
indeed, the marginal proﬁts available from whaling. It is argued that it is domestic Japanese politics
(Clapham et al., 2007) and attempts to create new norms in more economically important ﬁsheries
agreements that now drive the demand for continued whaling.
Japan is one of the few states in the world that assertively supports its claims to resume
commercial whaling. The IWC enacted a moratorium on commercial whaling in 1982 but even
before the zero catch quotas had come into force the Japanese Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and
Fisheries, Moriyoshi Sato, stated,
“The government will do its utmost to ﬁnd out ways to maintain the nation’s whaling in the form of
research or other forms” (Cherfas, 1985).
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Thus, began a sustained programme of “resistance” to the implementation of the IWC moratorium.
This included launching a programme of “scientiﬁc” permit whaling, ostensibly allowed for under
Article VIII of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW). Indeed, Japan’s
extensive Antarctic whaling only paused when it was ruled illegal and “not for the purposes of
science” by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in its landmark 2014 ruling1 However, in late
2015, despite failing to obtain IWC or scientiﬁc support, Japan’s whaling ﬂeet sailed to the Antarctic
under a new permit (NEWREP-A)2 with the intention of taking 333 minke whales. At the same
time Japan signaled that it would not countenance any future challenges when it withdrew from
the jurisdiction of the ICJ with respect to “research on, or conservation, management or exploitation
of, living resources of the sea” 3
But maybe this assertive move should not have come as a shock to observers of Japanese policy
within the IWC.
The 1946 signing of the ICRW was an important jurisprudential step in establishing the principle
of international regulation of a common property resource both in the high seas and national
waters. However, since joining the IWC in 1951, Japan has actively sought to limit IWC jurisdiction,
for example, increasingly asserting its sovereignty within its 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone
1 Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia vs. Japan: New Zealand intervening) Judgment of 31 March 2014:
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?p1=3&p2=1&case=148&p3=4.
2 Government of Japan, NEWREP-A: Available online at: https://iwc.int/document_3550.
3 Yoshikawa, M., Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations (6th October, 2015) International Court of Justice:
Available online at: http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3&code=JP.
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(EEZ) over the accepted norms of IWC control of whaling in “all
waters in which whaling is prosecuted” 4 and subsequently arguing
against IWC competency for small cetaceans (Morikawa, 2009).
The use of IWC objections procedures and the creative
interpretation of Article VIII permits, appears to be a strategy
to bring the IWC to an impasse, allowing Japan to claim that
the IWC is “dysfunctional” (Kirby, 2006). Alongside procedural
maneuvers Japan has encouraged social scientists to champion
views that exemptions for Inuit whalers under Aboriginal
Subsistence Whaling (ASW) should lead to a broader deﬁnition
of “subsistence” that allows for a greater amount of commercial
trade (Schieber, 1998)—a result that could directly beneﬁt its
coastal whaling operations for which Japan has consistently
claimed similarities to ASW.
The recent decision by Japan to apparently disregard the
IWC’s scientiﬁc committee’s critiques (Brierley and Clapham,
2016), and to withdraw from the jurisdiction of the ICJ appears to
increasingly indicate that Japan’s powerful Ministry of Fisheries
seeks not be bound by international norms with respect to
whaling and should be a warning bell for any nations engaged
in any resource access debate with Japan. Indeed Clapham (2015)
believes that the history of Japan in the IWC in “deny[ing] the
existence of population declines and the need for lower catch
limits, exploitation of IWC procedures to block or delay progressive
measures...” has been a fundamental way of working for Japan
since it joined.
Some authors have pointed to the incestuous relationships
between the Japanese Government and those who proﬁt from
whaling. For example, Clapham (2015) notes the Institute of
Cetacean Research (ICR), the “quasi-governmental” body that
carries out “scientiﬁc” whaling, is funded by sales of whale
meat and from direct subsidies, whilst the government relies
on the “independence” of the ICR to claim scientiﬁc legitimacy
of its continued use of an IWC loophole. Atsushi and Okubo
(2007) go so far as to argue that this relationship is so
institutionalized that Japan has been happy with the scientiﬁc
whaling status quo.
Morikawa (2009) points to the policy of aging whaling
proponents amongst the Ministry of Fisheries “retiring” into
the ﬁsheries conglomerates that ﬁnancially beneﬁt from Japan’s
continued whaling. Hirata (2005) argues that this domestic
bubble of shared interests makes Japan almost impervious to
external pressures when it comes to ending whaling.
Furthermore, some commentators remain cautious about
Japan changing its position anytime soon. Clapham (2015) notes
that Japan is intent on “pursuing its long-term plan of attempting
to obtain the votes necessary to lift the moratorium and reinstate
commercial whaling.”
Japan had announced as early as 1999 that it was giving aid
to countries in the hope of changing the balance of votes at the
Commission (Brown, 1999). The then Japanese Vice-Minister for
Fisheries stated:
“We would like to utilise overseas development aid as a practical
means to promote nations to join...which support Japan’s claim”

What Drives Japanese Whaling Policy?

Like many nations, Japan had, post 1960, established a
programme of using overseas development aid (ODA) to build
its international reputation. In contrast to its behavior in the
IWC, the Japanese ODA Blue Book calls for the “establishment
of the ‘rule of law’ in the international community” (Japanese
Diplomatic Blue Book, 2013). However, a 2012 review of Japanese
ODA5 states that “it is necessary to grasp not only the development
eﬀect but also the diplomatic eﬀect,” of such aid,
“Developing mutual understanding concerning sustainable use
of resources, without undue emphasis on conservation...’ and,
‘Supporting Japan’s position on issues such as the use of marine
resources, etc. in the international arena...”

The withdraw of Japan from the jurisdiction of the ICJ and its
preference for any future adjudication under other provisions of
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
may evidence an underlying strategy of increasingly militating
against the eﬀects of multilateral governance regimes when it
inconveniences them.
But this is not a new strategy. In the 1970s Japan had
fought against the creation of EEZs under the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). As Tarte
(1998) notes,
“...Shock waves spread quickly through the Japanese ﬁshing
industry... Fishing access agreements became a necessity within
Paciﬁc nations’ territorial waters, and it is in this context, that the
catalyst for Japanese foreign aid to the region can be found”.

According to Tarte, the precedence of Japanese interests over the
preferences of the recipients has remained a constant feature of
Japan’s aid programme to the region. Within these programmes
Cosgriﬀ (2001) notes, “By keeping negotiations bilateral, Japan is
able to exploit divisions between states to maximise its bargaining
power.”
Thus, where possible, Japan has sought to maximize its
ﬁsheries opportunities outside of multilateral agreements. Its
withdrawal from the jurisdiction of the ICJ should be viewed
with some concern as it potentially signiﬁcantly limits any
future challenge to Japan’s scientiﬁc whaling in an international
court, or, indeed, with respect to any ﬁsheries issues. Amor
(2012) notes that the ICJ and the Law of the Sea Tribunal
(ITLOS) “are serving a common goal of a mutually reinforcing
corpus of international law” but also notes that the ITLOS
has regularly referred to the judgments of the Court “with
respect to questions of international law and procedure,” and
also that the Court enjoys a more “general and comprehensive
jurisdiction than specialized judicial bodies.” Becker (2015)
develops this thought, noting that in seeking arbitration through
UNCLOS any “claims to be litigated would need to concern
the interpretation or application of a UNCLOS provision” and
could not address the generality of Japan’s actions with respect to
the ICRW.
5 Nomura

4 ICRW (1946) Article 1(2): https://archive.iwc.int/pages/view.php?ref=3607&k=.
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The domestic power of the whaling block within the Japanese
Ministry of Fisheries should not be underestimated. Work
by Strand and Truman (2009) suggests that the Fisheries
Ministry has been the main beneﬁciary of an aggressive
ODA policy, within the context of the Japanese Government
solidifying its rhetoric around a distinctly nationalistic
agenda.
Of growing concern to many external observers6 is the rise
of Nippon Kaigi, a nationalistic revisionist grouping within
the Japanese Cabinet, Diet and Japanese society (Day, 2014).
Historical issues have long colored Japan’s relationships with
its neighbors, particularly China and South Korea, but this
new nationalism is seeking to redeﬁne and reinforce whaling
as part of the nationalist narrative. This nationalistic linkage
to whaling goes back to at least 1982. The Liberal Democratic
Party (LDP), then, as now, wishing to shore up its rural
political support, including from ﬁshing communities (Moreby,
1982), has been careful to back the establishment’s whaling
position. There is even an LDP Parliamentary League for
Whaling.
This author suggests that the nationalistic rhetoric and
accompanying spurious projection of Japan’s problems as being
caused by Euro-American aggression (Oh and Ishizawa-Grbić,
2000) helps us understand the way whaling is used as a symbol
of “being Japanese” and of a Japan that is perceived to be under
constant external pressure by foreigners.
6 Congressional

Research Service (2014) ‘Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress
(page 6), 24 February. Available online at: http://mansﬁeldfdn.org/mfdn2011/wpcontent/uploads/2014/02/USJ.Feb14.RL33436.pdf.

REFERENCES
Amor, B. S. (2012). “The International Court of Justice and the
Law of the Sea,” in Universidad Nacional Autónoma de MéxicoInstituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas. Mexico: Anuario Mexicanode
Derecho Internacional, Décimo Aniversario, 2–26. Available online at:
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/r29686.pdf
Atsushi, I., and Okubo, A. (2007). An alternative explanation of Japan’s Whaling
Diplomacy in the Post-Moratorium Era. J. Int. Wildlife Law Policy 10, 55–87.
doi: 10.1080/13880290701229911
Becker, M. J. (2015). Japan’s New Optional Clause Declaration at the ICJ: A PreEmptive Strike? Blog of the European Journal of International Law. Available
online at: http://www.ejiltalk.org/japans-new-optional-clause-declaration-atthe-icj-a-pre-emptive-strike/
Brakes, P., and Simmonds, M. P. (2011). Whales and Dolphins, Cognition,
Culture,Conservation and Human Perceptions. London: Earthscan.
Brierley, A. S., and Clapham, P. J. (2016). Whaling permits: Japan’s whaling is
unscientiﬁc. Nature 529, 283. doi:10.1038/529283a
Brown, P. (1999). Japan Admits Using Aid to Build Pro-Whaling Vote.
London: Guardian Newspaper. Available online at: http://www.theguardian.
com/environment/1999/nov/11/whaling.internationalnews
Burnett, D. G. (2012). The Sounding of the Whale, Science and Cetaceans in the
Twentieth Century. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.
Cherfas, J. (1985). More whales harpooned ‘for science.’ New Scientist
105:1044.

Frontiers in Marine Science | www.frontiersin.org

What Drives Japanese Whaling Policy?

It also allows us to contextualize the Japanese nationalist
polemic that whaling is a Japanese “tradition” that has been
subject to foreign attempts to control the “very soul of Japan.”
As noted by O’Dwyer (2013), “While most Japanese today
rarely eat whale meat, some defend pelagic whaling out of a
belief that Japanese eating habitats should not be dictated to by
foreign activists”
Thus, it is argued here that Japanese whaling policy is
a complex product of domestic political forces, an industry
maintained by direct and indirect subsidies, and an increasing
nationalistic whaling narrative. Maybe more worryingly, we
should recognize that the debate within the IWC is not just
about protecting whales, but is increasingly a testing ground
for Japan in establishing new international norms for the
exploitation of all marine species, and that the consequences of
acquiescence to Japan’s ambitions will have major repercussions
for many other species in desperate need of international
conservation.
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